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Anthony Gordon has spent only a short time playing in Spain and already appears ready to accept one of the most depressing ideas England could possibly carry into another major tournament: that English footballers simply are not built to control matches with the ball.
That argument should be rejected immediately. Gordon has backed Thomas Tuchel’s suggestion that possession and control do not come naturally to English players, even floating the idea that England should instead embrace physicality, direct football and counter-attacking. It sounds like a description of limitations England must accept rather than problems an elite coach should be trying to solve.
That is precisely why the language about “DNA” is so dangerous. Once a weakness is described as cultural or innate, responsibility begins to disappear. If England cannot dominate possession because it is somehow not part of who English players are, the manager has a ready-made explanation every time his team retreats into its own half against elite opposition.
We have already seen where that thinking can lead. England were leading Argentina in a World Cup semi-final after Gordon himself scored, yet the game changed dramatically as Tuchel became more defensive. Gordon was substituted, defenders were introduced and England increasingly surrendered territory before Argentina eventually turned the match around.
That was not genetics. It was not some mysterious defect passed down through generations of English footballers. It was a tactical choice made in a high-pressure match, and no amount of talk about national footballing identity should be allowed to disguise it.
The contradiction becomes even more glaring when you examine the footballers available to England. This is a country producing players such as Cole Palmer, Phil Foden, Jude Bellingham, Bukayo Saka, Trent Alexander-Arnold and Kobbie Mainoo. These are not technically terrified footballers raised on muddy pitches and told to launch the ball towards a six-foot-five centre-forward.
Indeed, some of the most obvious technical options were not even central to Tuchel’s World Cup plans. Palmer, Foden and Alexander-Arnold were left out of the tournament squad, while Mainoo did not play a minute. It takes some nerve to limit access to several of your most technically gifted footballers and then conclude that the national talent pool simply lacks the characteristics required to control possession.
Gordon himself said England had the better players against Argentina and acknowledged that the team did not perform in matches as well as it had in training. That should lead to a far more uncomfortable question than whether Spanish footballers possess some almost mystical ability English players cannot acquire: why did England look so much braver and more accomplished on the training pitch than when the pressure arrived?
That is where coaching matters most. International management is not about identifying what your players already do comfortably and surrendering everything else. The best coaches construct a system that maximises strengths, disguises weaknesses and gives elite footballers the confidence to execute under pressure.
The most concerning thing about Gordon’s comments is therefore not Gordon himself. It is that one of England’s important players already appears to have absorbed an explanation that risks turning Tuchel’s tactical conservatism into an unavoidable characteristic of English football.
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England have the players — the question is how they are used
Nobody needs England to become Spain.
That part of Gordon’s argument is perfectly reasonable. International football should not be an exercise in imitation, and England would be foolish to discard the pace, athleticism, direct running and physical power that make many of their best players dangerous.
But rejecting imitation does not require rejecting possession.
Modern football is not divided into Spain endlessly passing the ball and England charging forward on the counter-attack. The Premier League itself destroys that simplistic argument every weekend. English players operate successfully inside sophisticated possession structures, pressing systems and positional attacks under some of the world’s most demanding coaches.
Pep Guardiola did not arrive in England and conclude that the country’s footballing culture made controlling the ball impossible. Jurgen Klopp did not decide English players were only capable of defending deep and counter-attacking. Mikel Arteta has not built Arsenal around the assumption that technical control belongs exclusively to another nationality.
Different coaches have different philosophies, but the principle is the same: they coach players to execute them.
England’s national team should demand the same ambition.
If Tuchel believes his squad cannot play like Spain, fine. It does not need to. But there is an enormous gap between refusing to imitate Spain and retreating into a defensive shell when leading a World Cup semi-final.
The latter is not English identity. It is caution.
The Argentina defeat should be a warning, not a blueprint
Gordon deserves credit for acknowledging that the players also carried responsibility for what happened against Argentina. Footballers make decisions once they cross the white line and no manager remotely controls every pass, run or defensive action.
But that cannot absolve the head coach.
England had the lead. Gordon had scored. He says he felt full of confidence and was surprised when he was removed. Tuchel then strengthened the defence, England retreated and the initiative shifted towards Argentina.
Managers are judged precisely on decisions like those.
There is a particularly uncomfortable irony in Tuchel’s position because when he originally took the England job, one of his themes was removing fear and allowing the players to express themselves. Yet when England reached the biggest moment of his tenure, the handbrake appeared to go firmly back on.
That is the lesson England should be discussing before Euro 2028.
Not whether English footballers possess some predetermined national inability to keep possession, but whether England will finally appoint or empower a coach prepared to trust their attacking talent when the pressure is at its greatest.
Because another tournament will eventually produce another Argentina moment. England will take a lead against an elite opponent with 20 or 30 minutes remaining, and the manager will have a decision to make. Does he continue asking his most talented players to impose themselves, or does he add defenders, concede territory and hope to survive?
England have tried the second option often enough.
Spain’s superiority is learned, not genetic
There is, of course, something substantial behind Gordon’s admiration for Spanish football. Spain have spent years developing a culture that places enormous emphasis on technical security, spatial awareness and decision-making with the ball. Gordon now experiences that environment every day at Barcelona and is entitled to recognise differences between the two football cultures.
But culture is not DNA.
Football development is the product of academies, coaching, selection, tactical ideas and thousands of hours spent teaching young players how the game should be played. Spain were not born with an extra possession chromosome. Their football evolved because generations of coaches and institutions decided certain qualities mattered and developed players accordingly.
England have changed enormously too.
The generation represented by Palmer, Saka, Bellingham, Foden, Alexander-Arnold and Mainoo has grown up in a football environment almost unrecognisable from the stereotypical English game of previous decades. Premier League academies are among the most sophisticated in the world, and England’s youth teams have repeatedly demonstrated that technically accomplished players can be produced here.
That makes surrendering to the “DNA” argument particularly frustrating.
If England can produce technical footballers but refuse to trust them when tournaments become frightening, the problem is not English DNA. It is English decision-making.
England need courage more than another identity debate
Tomorrow’s Nations League game against Spain provides an immediate opportunity to change the conversation. Beating the world champions in September would not erase a World Cup semi-final defeat, but playing assertively against them would at least demonstrate that England have learned something from it.
Tuchel does not have to turn England into Barcelona. He does not need 70 per cent possession or hundreds of meaningless passes. Direct football can be devastating. Counter-attacking can win major tournaments. England should absolutely exploit the speed and power available to them.
What they cannot do is turn those strengths into an excuse for tactical fear.
There is a difference between deliberately attacking space quickly and spending the final half-hour of a knockout game desperately protecting your own penalty area. There is a difference between counter-attacking as an aggressive weapon and counter-attacking because you have voluntarily handed the opposition control of the match.
A top manager knows that difference.
England’s talent level should make this one of the most exciting international teams in the world. The challenge is finding a tactical identity ambitious enough to match it rather than repeatedly convincing those players that restraint is sophistication.
Perhaps Gordon’s comments reveal how deeply Tuchel’s interpretation has already entered the dressing room. If so, that should worry the FA far more than whether England can perfectly replicate Spain’s possession statistics.
England do not need to become Spain.
They need to stop behaving as though Spain have exclusive ownership of technical football.
And if the next major tournament ends with England protecting a narrow lead, retreating towards their own goal and eventually collapsing under pressure, nobody should blame DNA.
Blame the decision to play scared.
This article is an opinion and analysis piece. The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views or official position of BettingTips4You.com or BSpin Limited.


